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Abstract
Common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient
because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by
marginal firms counting on future bailouts. Our model shows how governments
can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to avoid these distortions and points to
the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations, such as TARP.
JEL: P16, P14, D72.
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Prior to 2007, most academic economists viewed government bailouts as aberrations of
developing countries, artifacts of political patronage, or idiosyncrasies of the banking industry.
The academic consensus view of governmental interventions generally—and corporate bailouts
specifically—is largely negative in light of the potential moral-hazard problems caused by such
interventions. Even in the banking literature, where a few exceptions (discussed below) can be
found, bailouts rarely garner more than grudging approval. This academic skepticism has a
long pedigree. As early as 1873, Walter Bagehot wrote:
If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue bad and will probably become
worse if the Government sustains and encourages them. The cardinal maxim is, that
any aid to a present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of
a future good bank.
Almost a century and a half later, Bagehot’s admonition remains popular among economists. For
example, in his “Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture,” Calomiris (1999) opens
with:
Problem 1: Counterproductive financial bailouts of insolvent banks, their creditors,
and debtors by governments, often assisted by the IMF, have large social costs. Bailouts
are harmful for several reasons. First, they entail large increases in taxation of
average citizens to transfer resources to wealthy risk-takers. Tax increases are always
distortionary, and serve to accentuate the unequal wealth distribution. Second,
by bailing out risk takers local governments and the IMF subsidize, and hence
encourage, risk taking. Moral-hazard incentive problems magnify truly exogenous
shocks that confront banking systems. Excessive risk taking by banks results in
banking collapses and produces the fiscal insolvency of governments that bail out
banks, leading to exchange rate collapse. Banks willingly and knowingly take on
more risks—especially default risks and exchange risks—than they would if they
were not protected by government safety nets.
And yet, to the consternation of many economists, and contrary to much received academic
wisdom, governments have time and again ridden to the rescue of banks and other “too big to fail”
institutions during economic crises. Notable recent examples include the controversial bailouts
of General Motors and Chrysler in December 2008. Although the federal government provided
more than $80 billion in assistance, both companies had to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection by June 2009. And although we are again in a state of relative calm, there is little
reason to believe that 2008 was the last government bailout. More than likely, policymakers in
the U.S. and elsewhere will have to grapple with the same issues again: to bailout or not to
bailout—that is the question. Reading many academic discussions, it is easy for them to come
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to the conclusion that bailouts inevitably distort incentives ex-ante and thus inevitably beget
more bailouts. But is this really true?
Our paper develops a simple model to help assess bailouts.
In our model, the government’s objective differs from those of firms in that it cares about
social externalities. Our specification can capture a wide variety of social benefits and costs.
Stakeholders with surplus can include existing and future customers, suppliers, employees,
creditors, entrepreneurs, and “communities” that benefit from the firm’s operation. Their
interests can be diffuse and difficult to isolate (and to coordinate), and they possess little real
or formal influence over corporate decisions. The social costs can also include the inefficient
components of additional unemployment, the costs of moving capital resources, etc. If the
non-internalized stakes are positive, then the government can have a legitimate interest to keep
a moribund firm alive.
Our government has no special powers, managerial skills, or access to unique information.
It is not an omniscient social planner with the power to micro-manage wages or coerce effort.
Rather, its abilities are very limited: It can only provide funds to keep the firm solvent; it can
insist on firing employees if it provides bailout funding; and it can tax firms to finance bailouts
but only in a non-discriminatory fashion. We do not even assume that the government is capable
of committing itself to a future bailout policy.
Yet, in our model, there is a surprisingly parsimonious policy that (usually) preserves the
social externalities, without affecting the incentives of firms and employees. Thus, if distorted
incentives from government taxation and funding were the only concerns in real-world bailouts,
our model suggests that their negative incentive effects could be relatively easily reduced or
eliminated. Importantly, our paper does not show that real-world bailouts do not create social
net costs. Instead, our paper shows where these costs can and cannot lie. We view our results as
a background “indifference theorem” against which the effects of distortions should be assessed.
Although the results may seem obvious in retrospect, following from our assumptions, they
are not widely appreciated. The key point of our paper is that bailouts do not necessarily beget
more bailouts. The moral-hazard issues arise not because of the bailout per se, but because
of assumptions about the treatment of stakeholders in bailouts. This is as simple a point as it
is important. It is not often brought out in informal discussions of bailouts—and there is no
existing formal literature on government bailouts in non-financial contexts.
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The model suggests the following policies:
• Incumbent employees should be fully expropriated1 in a bailout. (This is possible if/when
alternatives are readily available.) They are then no more or less eager to be bailed out a
priori than they are in the absence of government intervention. Their effort incentives
remain the same.
• Corporate owners should be fully expropriated in a bailout. They are then no more or less
eager to be bailed out a priori than they are in the absence of government intervention.
• Corporate owners should be taxed on profits (revenues net of all costs, including up-front
investment costs) to fund bailouts. Such a corporate tax is proportional to NPV, so that
any project that is positive (negative) NPV in the absence of taxation remains positive
(negative) NPV in the presence of taxation. Firms are then no more or less eager to invest
a priori than they are in the absence of government intervention.
Note that governments cannot fund bailouts through extraordinary taxes on bailed-
out firms. Any tax on bailed-out firms simply increases the bailout amount that the
government must offer to get the firm to continue. In effect, any tax would be on itself.
The only “closed-system” option is a redistributive tax, where healthy firms pay into an
actuarially-balanced fund.
With good policies, society may be better off when it bails out firms that cannot internalize
diffuse and often silent social externalities.2 But this is not a Pareto improvement. The govern-
ment creates winners and losers. In our basic model, the intervention is a wealth transfer from
corporations to stakeholders. Corporations pay to cover these interventions with corporate taxes,
and gain nothing in case of failure. Thus, government involvement would likely incur resistance
from the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. However, in an extended model,
there could be a second effect. It is possible that profits are themselves elastic with respect to
social externalities. For example, car buyers are classic stakeholders who rely on the presence
of after-market support. The presence of an implicit bailout guarantee may well be critical to
attracting car buyers in the first place. In this case, even the car companies may be better off
and welcome the presence of the government as a guarantor of last resort.3
1For both capital and labor, expropriation means that they do not receive rents in bailouts. For capital, this
is accomplished by a minimum subsidy. For labor, this is accomplished by removing the manager. In both cases,
expropriation is not worse than what they would receive absent the bailout.
2In some models of [bank] bailouts, such externalities may occur even among explicit stakeholders, as in
holdout problems in the presence of debt overhang.
3A similar argument can be made about deposit insurance. Our model suggests that if deposit insurance were
raised on bank profits (rather than deposits, which does not take costs into account), the “deposit insurance tax”
would not encourage or discourage banks from taking on good (positive-NPV) deposits. The loss of all stakes in
default would make bank owners and employees as averse to failure in the presence as in the absence of deposit
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With little intrinsic increase in moral hazard, our perspective is that government bailouts
are not necessarily the bane they are often considered to be. They are more alike ordinary
government interventions than they are different. The model then shines light on the real
sources of the social costs and benefits of bailouts:
• If firms are not NPV optimizers and/or if there is a margin along which the government
cannot tax firms (e.g., leisure by the original investors or non-domestic operations),
then the presence of taxes can discourage firms from partaking. The taxes necessary to
fund bailouts then impose negative social externalities. Of course, similar inefficiencies
also apply if the bailout funding originates from taxes on third parties elsewhere in the
economy. In general, the tax inefficiencies of bailouts are not intrinsically different from
those of any tax in the economy.
The net result of tax distortions is that fewer firms would be started. It is a consequence
of taxation on successful firms. It implies that bailouts are not harmful because they
attract (bad) firms that should never have been started and exist because they want to
take advantage of government funding. Instead, bailouts are harmful because they reduce
the number of (good) firms that do not start.
• If owners or employees succeed in creating inefficient bailout rules that preserve some
of their stakes, then they have less incentive a priori to avoid failure. Owners may then
take on projects that are negative NPV, and employees may slack off, less afraid of failure.
This issue can become worse if they can “hold up” a government that is eager to keep the
social externalities in the firm alive.
The net result of residual-stake distortion is that there would be too much entry into the
industry subject to bailouts, not enough effort, too many failures, and too many bailouts.
• If the government is inefficient and/or if there are reputational spillover effects, it is
unclear what the outcome will be. For example, if the government fails to recognize the
full social benefits that a reallocation of resources to other industries would produce,
or if the government’s costs of administering bailouts are much higher than the social
costs of administering bankruptcy or liquidation, then it may bail out too many firms.
If the government has coordination problems that make it difficult to raise the funding
necessary for bailouts (e.g., in an economic crisis situation), then it may bail out too few
firms. If the party in power has a desire to satisfy its voters rather than maximize social
welfare (e.g., favoring bailouts on the left and opposing them on the right), then there
could be too few or too many bailouts.
insurance. The fact that bank equity and/or internal traders like to take on excessive risk is a cost of equity or of
internal governance, and occurs with or without government intervention. If bailouts induce lenders to provide
risky capital, they should count as equity and be expropriated, too.
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The net results of the inefficient-government distortion are unclear.
In sum, our model provides an alternative perspective to the dominant sentiment in the
academic literature that emphasizes the negative aspects of bailouts, market failures, and
the distortions that interventions and their accompanying taxes cause. The argument that
bailouts beget further failures is too simplistic. Well-designed bailouts are not intrinsically more
worrisome than other common taxation or government interventions. Thus, they should be
compared, on the margin, to ordinary government intervention.
Our paper now proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the model in the absence of govern-
ment. Section 2 shows how a well-structured bailout need not change either the investment
behavior or managerial effort. Section 3 considers the implications: What is actually required
for bailouts to create or destroy social value? Section 4 discusses the TARP in light of our
model. Section 5 reviews related work. Because most bailouts occurred historically in the
financial-services industry, this literature has in turn appeared mostly in the academic banking
literature. And Section 6 concludes.
1 Model Without Government Intervention
Our base model starts with a firm and a representative employee (with a possible replacement).
The firm makes investment and hiring/firing decisions. The employee (a manager or worker)
provides effort. There are two time periods with no inter-temporal discounting.
At time 1, the firm decides whether to invest in a project with initial cost, I1>0. Firms have
sufficient funds to begin the project. The project can be a “success,” yielding a gross payoff
R1>0, or a “failure,” yielding gross payoff 0.
The probability of success depends on managerial effort. For simplicity, the probability of
success is the manager’s effort level, e1. Thus, the project fails with probability 1−e1. The
manager bears a private cost of providing effort of c·e21/2, where c0 is assumed “large”
relative to other parameters.4 Effort should not be taken literally here. It is a modeling device
to characterize a conflict of interest between managers and owners that can be remedied by
paying success-contingent compensation. The conflict could equally well be a desire to build
empires or not to perform unpleasant tasks (such as fighting bureaucracy or unions).5
4Specifically, we assume that c≥(R1 + S). This is necessary and sufficient to keep the first-best effort a valid
probability weakly less than 1.
5At the cost of tractability, one could introduce alternative algebraic specifications translating effort into success
probability. That said, because “effort” has no natural measuring unit, we lose little generality from our current
setup, which uses convex effort costs and basic parameter restrictions (c > (R1 + S)) to bound 0 ≤ e1 ≤ 1.
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The project payoff is then realized and the firm must pay the manager the success-contingent
wage of w1≥0. It is straightforward to show that the firm will choose not to pay wages if the
project fails and has no revenues. As is customary in this literature, we do not allow the manager
to purchase the firm and thereby circumvent the main incentive problem.6
At time 2, the firm has a real option to either abandon the project or “restart” it for an
additional investment of I2>0. If the firm restarts, the firm can dismiss or keep the manager,
FF = {FIRE, RETAIN} (Fire by Firm). The replacement manager is assumed to have equal ability to
the initial manager, which in our model maps into the same cost of effort c. (Section 3 discusses
the equal-ability assumption.)
The “restarted” project proceeds much like the first-period project, except (i) there are no
additional restarts, and (ii) its payoff is related to the performance of the project in the first
period. Thus, if the restarted project fails, it again yields gross payoffs of 0. If it succeeds, it
yields gross payoff R2, j, where j={H, L} indicates whether the time 1 project was a success (H)
or failure (L). We assume R2,H≥R2,L—after a successful start, future project payoffs are higher
than after a botched start. The probability of success in the restarted project in state j depends
on managerial effort at time 2, e2, j. The manager again bears a private cost of providing effort
of c·e22, j/2.
After the project payoff at time 2 has been realized, the firm must pay the manager the
success-contingent wage of w2, j≥0. (Again, it is optimal not to pay managers if revenues are
zero.) The game then ends. Figure 1 illustrates the sequential nature of the game.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We assume that the project has additional social benefits S, which do not depend on the
managerial effort but accrue whenever the firm operates and succeeds.7 These social benefits
embody the payoffs of other stakeholders if the firm succeeds. The same S applies at time 2
in the event of success in both the H and the L states. Neither the firm nor the manager can
capture and thereby internalize this surplus, e.g., because the stakeholders are too diffuse and
heterogeneous.
To make this an interesting problem and for all solutions to stay in the correct domains, we
add some parametric assumptions. First, we consider only cases in which model parameters
6The non-negativity of wages is the functional equivalent of limited liability for the manager. It would be
straightforward to introduce private managerial benefits if the project succeeds, which, in contrast to wages, would
obtain even without managerial effort. Like wages, they would accrue only upon success. The conclusions of our
model would remain unaltered, because such benefits would merely reduce the wage that the firm needs to pay
managers.
7Our qualitative implications would hold if we assumed instead that social benefits accrued whenever the firm
operates, regardless of success or failure.
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render it optimal for firms to invest at time 1:8
1
c
·

R1
2
+
3·R22,H
16·c −
I2
2
2
≥ I1 . (A1)
Second, we assume that the project is positive (negative) NPV at time 2 if the initial project
succeeds (fails) at time 1:
R22,L
4·c ≤ I2 ≤
R22,H
4·c . (A2)
Third, we assume that the continuation project’s NPV at time 2 in the H state is not too high:
R22,H
4·c − I2 ≤ 2·c − R1 . (A3)
This insures that equilibrium effort is below 1, which is required to allow us to map effort into
a valid probability of success:
In sum, our model’s ingredients are as canonical as possible. A firm has a project that
has an up-front investment cost and positive revenues if the project succeeds. The success
probability increases with the effort of a manager who dislikes effort but can be motivated with
a success-contingent wage. In all, it has seven exogenous parameters:
Investment costs I1 and I2
Success-Contingent Revenues R1, R2,L, R2,H
Managerial Effort Cost Parameter c
Stakeholder Benefits S
and six endogenous continuous variables:
Success-Contingent Wages w1, w2,L, w2,H
Managerial efforts e1, e2,L, e2,H
In addition, the firm has some discrete choices: It can decide whether to start a project and/or
whether to continue it; and if the firm operates the project, it can decide whether to fire or
retain the manager (FF) at time 2 after the state j is revealed.
8In real life, it may well be that firms produce social externalities that are high enough to warrant even further
government incentives upon success. However, this is not the problem at hand. Section 3 discusses this further.
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1.1 First-Best
To illustrate the model, we first derive the socially first-best effort. The expected social welfare
consists of firm revenues and social externalities (wages are transfers), net of effort costs and
investment,
svt, j( et ) = et ·
 
R2, j + S
 − c·e2t
2
− It .
The ex-ante total expected social welfare is therefore
SV = sv1( e1 ) + e1 · sv2,H( e2,H ) + (1 − e1) · sv2,L( e2,L ) .
At time 2, the first-best effort levels are
eFB2, j =
R2, j + S
c
.
Substituting this back into the sv2, j yields
sv2, j =
(R2, j + S)2
2·c − I2 .
When R2,L + S is large enough relative to c and I2, it is worthwhile to continue firms even in
the L state.
At time 1, if it is socially optimal to continue the project regardless of its initial outcome,
the socially-optimal effort is
SV = max
e1
e1 · (R1 + S) + e1 ·

(R2,H + S)2
2·c − I2

+ (1 − e1) ·

(R2,L + S)2
2·c − I2

.
Solving the FOC yields
eFB1 =
R1 + S
c
+
(R2,H + S)2 − (R2,L + S)2
2·c2 .
First-best social welfare is
SV FB =
h
R1 + S +
(R2,H+S)2− (R2,L+S)2
2·c
i2
+ (R2,L + S)2
2·c − I1 − I2 .
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1.2 Equilibrium
In the real world, firms cannot force their employees to provide the socially-optimal effort.
They can only motivate them by paying success-contingent wages. We assume that firms cannot
commit to long-term compensation contracts at time 1 that are suboptimal at time 2. Therefore,
we consider only subgame-perfect equilibria of our model.
Definition 1 A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a set of success-contingent wages {w1, w2,L, w2,H},
managerial efforts {e1, e2,L, e2,H}, the firm’s decision to retain the manager in states L and H (FF),
and the firm’s continuation decision in states L and H (FC being the decision to continue), such
that at time 2
1. e2, j(w2, j ) = argmax m2, j ≡ e2, j·w2, j − (c/2)·e22, j ,
2. w2, j( e2, j ) = argmax pi2, j ≡ e2, j · (R2, j − w2, j) − I2 ,
3. and the firm continues (FC=1) in state j iff pi2, j ≥ 0 ;
and such that at time 1
1. e1(w1, w2, j,FF,FC ) = argmax e1·(w1 + mcH) + (1 − e1)·mcL − (c/2)·e21, where mc j =
m2, j if the incumbent manager is retained in state j and mc j = 0 if not, and
2.

w1( e1, e2, j,FF,FC ); FF
	
= arg max e1·(R1 − w1 + max{0,pi2,H}) + (1 − e1)·max{0,pi2,L} − I1.
We can now solve for this equilibrium.
At time 2, under Assumption (A2), the firm does not restart the project at time 2 if the initial
project was a failure, w2,L=e2,L=0. Therefore, suppose the initial project was a success (H) and
the firm has already restarted the project. At this point, I2 is sunk. The firm offers the manager
a contract paying w2,H if the project succeeds, and 0 if it fails (which turns out to be optimal).
The manager now expects to receive
m2,H ≡ e2,H · w2,H − c·e22,H/2 .
Her payoff-maximizing effort is
e2,H(w2,H ) = w2,H/c ,
which results in expected continuation profits (pi) for the firm of
pi2,H = e2,H(w2,H ) · (R2,H − w2,H).
Therefore, the firm optimally pays the success-contingent wage w∗2,H = R2,H/2. This wage
induces a managerial effort level of
e∗2,H =
R2,H
2·c .
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This is half the first-best effort in the absence of social externalities. The continuation value for
the manager after a successful project at time 1 is therefore
m∗2,H = e
∗
2,H · w∗2,H −
c·e∗22,H
2
=
R22,H
8·c .
The firm’s expected time 2 profits are
pi∗2,H = e
∗
2,H ·

R2,H − w∗2,H
 − I2 = R22,H4·c − I2 .
Given behavior at time 2, we can now determine the optimal firm behavior at time 1.
At time 1, the firm can decide whether to fire or retain the manager, based on whether the
project returned R1 or 0. At time 1, the manager expects to receive
e1 · (w1 + mcH) − c·e
2
1
2
,
where mcH is the amount a manager expects to receive at time 2 in the H state. If she expects to
be replaced by another manager, then mcH=0; if she expects to continue, mcH = m∗2,H . (Recall
also that mcL = 0.) The optimal managerial effort is
e1(w1 ) =
w1
c
+
mcH
c
.
Anticipating this effort, the firm maximizes
Π ≡
w1
c
+
mcH
c

· R1 − w1 + pi∗2,H − I1 ,
which implies a profit-maximizing wage of
w∗1 =
R1
2
+
R22,H
8·c −
I2
2
− mcH
2
.
At this wage, the optimal managerial effort is
e∗1 =
R1
2·c +
R22,H
8·c2 −
I2
2·c +
mcH
2·c ,
and the firm’s maximized profits are
Π =
1
c
·

R1
2
+

f
16

·

R22,H
c

− I2
2
2
− I1 ,
where
f =

3 if mcH = m∗2,H and mcL = 0
2 if mcH = mcL = 0
.
Clearly, Π is larger when mcH is m
∗
2,H . Managers work harder if they expect to be retained
upon success. Therefore, firms prefer to retain successful managers.
Collecting results we have the following optimal firm and managerial policies:
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Theorem 1 Under the parameter restrictions in (A1-A3), there is a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which the firm invests in the project at time 1 if and only if
1
c
·

R1
2
+
3·R22,H
16·c −
I2
2
2
≥ I1 .
Firms pay managerial wage w1 soliciting managerial effort e1 at time 1 of
w∗1 =
R1
2
+
R22,H
16·c −
I2
2
, e∗1 =
R1
2·c +
3·R22,H
16·c2 −
I2
2·c .
Firms continue the project only in case of early success (H). If they continue, they retain the
manager and pay managerial wage w2,H soliciting managerial effort e2,H at time 2 of
w∗2,H =
R2,H
2
, e∗2,H =
R2,H
2·c .
Social welfare is
SV = e∗1 · (R1 + S) −
 c
2

·e∗12 − I1 + e∗1 ·
h
e∗2,H ·(R2,H + S) −
 c
2

·e∗2,H 2 − I2
i
.
2 Government Intervention
Our model is designed to explore questions about how governmental taxation and bailout
policies affect investment decisions, wages, and effort. Thus, we now add a government that
can set a bailout policy at an initial time 0. The government internalizes the social and the
managerial surplus that firms do not. It can make three choices:
1. It can tax firms (at rate τ).
2. It can give firms a bailout amount (an amount g).
3. If it bails out a firm, it can decide whether to retain or fire the manager (FG = {FIRE, RETAIN}).
As already mentioned in the introduction, in designing its bailout policy, the government must
break even actuarially, i.e., it is a closed system. This is designed to capture Calomiris (1999)
point that not only the fund distribution (the bailout) but also the fund raising (the taxation)
can distort behavior and thus have welfare implications. Again, our model is a sketch: if the
government can tax other activities with fewer harmful distortions, it could well be appropriate
to be even more interventionist than our own model suggests.
By (A2), the firm is already continuing in the H state, so we do not need to consider a
government subsidy in this state. The interesting case is where the government bailout induces
the firm to continue after an initial failure (state L). We will now show that government
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intervention can keep the firm in business even in the L state (thereby capturing diffuse surplus)
without depressing managerial effort and without distorting investment decisions. This is
not obvious: both taxation of success to pay for the bailout and extra bailout funding in the
L state can potentially reduce the incentives of the manager. We will now show that there
is a non-distortionary intervention that consists of a bailout subsidy for firms in the L state,
financed with proportional taxes on profits (revenues net of costs, including wages and upfront
investment costs) on successful firms.9 The bailout subsidy is just sufficient to motivate the firm
to continue operations and forces out management to preserve incentives.
For what follows, we need one additional parametric assumption. We assume that the
continuation project’s NPV at time 2 in the L state is not too low.
I2 −
R22,L
4·c ≤
1
c ·

R1
2 +
3·R22,H
16·c − I22
2 − I1
1 − R12·c − 3·R
2
2,H
16·c2 +
I2
2·c
.
This insures that the tax rate satisfying the budget constraint for the government is less
than 100%. Above this threshold, government intervention would be incomplete.
2.1 Analysis
The analysis proceeds as before. At time 2, assume again that the firm has already restarted
the project, and I2 is sunk. The firm offers the manager a contract paying w2, j in the event that
the project succeeds at time 2, and zero otherwise. The manager now expects to receive
m2, j ≡ e2, j · w2, j − c·e22, j/2 .
Her payoff-maximizing effort is
e2, j(w2, j ) = w2, j/c ,
which, given tax rate τ, results in expected continuation profits for the firm of
pi2, j = (1 − τ) ·

e2, j(w2, j ) · (R2, j − w2, j) − I2

.
Therefore, the firm optimally pays a success-contingent wage of w∗2, j = R2, j/2. This induces a
managerial effort level of
e∗2, j =
R2, j
2·c .
The managerial effort is the same as it was in the absence of taxation. Furthermore, profit in the
H state is 1 − τ times the profit in the absence of taxation. This clarifies the effect of taxation
in the second period:
9The tax deduction on investment can be provided at the instant of the investment. The proportional tax yields
a tax credit for unsuccessful firms so that the government becomes de-facto a full partner to avoid distorting the
firm’s investment decisions.
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Lemma 1
1. A proportional tax on profits (revenues net of wages and investments) does not affect the
wage offered by firms and therefore does not affect managerial effort at time 2.
2. A proportional tax on profits does not reduce the incentives of the firm to restart the project
(in the good state H) at time 2.
The continuation value for a retained manager is
m∗2, j = e
∗
2, j · w∗2, j −
c·e∗22, j
2
=
R22, j
8·c ,
and the firm’s expected time 2 profits are
pi∗2, j( g j,τ ) = (1 − τ) ·

e∗2, j ·

R2, j − w∗2, j
 − I2 = (1 − τ) · R22, j4·c + g j − I2

.
where g j is the possible bailout funding in state j.
In the H state, (A2) assures that the firm continues without government intervention (g∗H=0).
In the L state, the government provides g∗L such that R
2
2,L/(4·c) + g∗L − I2 = 0. This is enough
to induce the firm to operate the project, which is sufficient for the government to maintain the
social benefits S. The tax rate is irrelevant, because the firm earns zero profit.
Lemma 2
1. In the L state, the government bailout amount of g∗L = I2 − R22,L/(4·c) leaves the original
firm owners exactly as well off as they were in the absence of government intervention, even
though the bailout induces firms not to abandon operations.
2. In the L state, taxes cannot raise incremental tax revenues. Any tax revenue would have to
be offset by an equally-large increase in the bailout in order for the firm not to abandon
operations.
This intervention leaves existing owners with a continuation value of zero. A tax on bailed-
out firms does not change the government’s budget constraint. In effect, any tax would simply
be on itself.
The final piece of the puzzle concerns the behavior at time 1. The manager chooses an
effort level that maximizes
e1 · (w1 + mcH) + (1 − e1) · (0 + mcL) − c·e
2
1
2
,
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where mc j is the expected managerial benefit to continuing on if retained in state j, i.e., m
∗
2,H
or m∗2,L, or zero if fired. The optimal effort choice at time 1 as a function of the wage is
e1(w1 ) =
w1
c
+
mcH − mcL
c
.
Given this wage-dependent effort, the firm maximizes its profits by setting wage of
w∗1 =
R1
2
+
R22,H
8·c −
I2
2
.
At wage w1, the incumbent owners of the firm receive
Π ≡ (1 − τ) ·
¨w1
c
+
mcH − mcL
c

·

R1 − w1 +

R22,H
4·c − I2

− I1
«
.
This uses the facts that (a) the government leaves the firm with a net profit of 0 in the L state
and (b) the continuation value R22,H/(4·c) − I2 is only taxed once. The firm sets a wage that
translates into in-equilibrium effort of
e∗1 =
R1
2·c +
R22,H
8·c2 −
I2
2·c +
mcH − mcL
2·c .
Corporate profits are
Π = (1 − τ) ·
(
1
c
·

R1
2
+

f
16

·

R22,H
c

− I2
2
2
− I1
)
,
where
f =

3 if mcH = m2,H and mcL = 0
2 if mcH = mcL
.
Thus, the maximum private profit is obtained if the manager is retained in H and fired in L.
Lemma 3 A government bailout does not change managerial effort at time 1 if the government
forces the manager to be fired in case of a bailout at time 2 and replaces her with an (equally good)
manager.
This result depends on the assumption that an equally-good replacement manager is available,
so that the government can punish the original manager by firing her without repercussions on
the efficiency of the firm in the L state. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.
We can now collect these results, which state how the government can bail out firms (in
state L) without affecting managerial effort and the firm’s investment choices:
Theorem 2 If the social externality S and net managerial benefits are large enough to outweigh
the negative corporate NPV of the project
S ≥ 2·c·I2
R2,L
− 3·R2,L
4
,
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then the government can improve social welfare without distorting managerial-effort or investment
choices by adopting the following policy:
• Provide a bailout g∗L = I2 − R22,L/(4·c) > 0 at time 2 if and only if the project at time 1 is
a failure (L).
• Replace the incumbent manager in a bailout (mc∗L = 0).
• Finance bailouts with a proportional tax on firm profit (gross payoff net of wages and
investment), where the tax rate is
τ∗ =

1 − R12·c − 3·R
2
2,H
16·c2 +
I2
2·c

·

I2 − R
2
2,L
4·c

1
c ·

R1
2 +
3·R22,H
16·c − I22
2 − I1 .
The social welfare is
SV = e∗1 · (R1 + S) −
 c
2

·e∗12 − I1
+ e∗1 ·
h
e∗2,H ·(R2,H + S) −
 c
2

·e∗2,H 2 − I2
i
+ (1 − e∗1)·
h
e∗2,L·(R2,L + S) −
 c
2

·e∗2,L2 − I2
i
.
Diffuse stakeholders and replacement managers are better off than they are in the absence of
government intervention, incumbent firm owners are worse off, and incumbent managers are
equally well off.
Proof: Managerial effort at time 2 is exactly as it was in the absence of government
intervention. Firm participation at time 2 is exactly as it was in the absence of
government intervention. However, in the H state, firms are now taxed. In the L
state, they have a continuation value of zero. The tax rate, τ∗, is determined by the
government’s budget constraint
τ∗ ·
1
c
·

R1
2
+
3·R22,H
16·c −
I2
2
2
− I1
 = (1 − e∗1) · g∗L.
The threshold social externality is determined by setting the social NPV of the
investment at time 2 (after an initial failure at time 1) equal to zero:
e∗2,L · (R2,L + Sc) −
c·e∗22,L
2
− I2 = R2,L2·c · (R2,L + S
c) − R
2
2,L
8·c − I2 = 0 ,
which solves to a minimal level of diffuse social benefits of Sc = 2·c·I2/R2,L −
3·R2,L/4.
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There are three features of non-distortionary bailouts:
1. A complete expropriation of owners (capital).
2. A complete expropriation of managers (labor).
3. A tax on profits net of wages and investments (not a revenue-based or flat tax) that finances
a redistribution of wealth from successful corporate owners to diffuse stakeholders. This
is effectively a proportional tax on NPV.
It is important not to tax the success and effort of labor, because labor has an “escape” margin
(effort provision) that NPV-maximizing capital does not have.
3 Implications
Theorem 2 is interesting not because we believe that its assumptions always or even regularly
apply in the real world, but because it clarifies where one should look for efficiency gains
and losses of government bailouts. It can guide the evaluation of when and how government
intervention should be conducted.
1. Bailouts are more advantageous when they maintain project operations to capture the
diffuse social value of continued operation that firms cannot capture by themselves. The
social benefits (including managerial surplus) should exceed the negative NPV of the
project for the firm itself. They have to be calculated net of the benefits that would arise
from deployment of resources to other activities in the economy.
2. Bailouts are more advantageous when their presence does not reduce but enhance project
revenues. For example, if assurance of non-abandonment increases product revenues
(e.g., as in deposit insurance increasing stakeholder participation), bailouts are relatively
more attractive.
3. Bailouts are more advantageous if firms have no alternative margins. It is this assump-
tion that made proportional taxation on profits not distort the (maximum-NPV) capital
budgeting decisions of firms. There are two margins of particular concern:
• Corporations may well move their operations to other domiciles where they are
taxed less.
• Owners may well substitute from taxed project investments to untaxed leisure.
Contrary to the common view, the second point makes it clear that the efficiency cost of
well-designed bailouts is less likely to be too much entry by firms that count on bailouts
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in case of failure, but more likely to be too little entry by firms that want to avoid being
taxed in case of success.
In real life, taxation may be more or less efficient and more or less “fair” than our model
has assumed. An immediate “fairness” suggestion would be to tax the diffuse stakeholders
(and/or replacement labor) that are the ultimate beneficiaries of the bailout, either ex-post
or ex-ante. Of course, from an efficiency perspective, “fairness” is not even important.
Taxes should be raised where the efficiency losses are lowest. Taxes on NPV can avoid
distortions in our model.
4. Bailouts are more advantageous if the government conducts them efficiently. Our analysis
has presumed that the government is a friction-free social-welfare optimizer. This is
defensible as a modeling assumption, but admittedly a utopian extreme. The effect of its
violation needs to be carefully assessed.
In real life, government often harbor other objectives. The most obvious issue is that
government itself is conflicted. Tullock (1967) has pointed out how lobbying is likely
to help determine who is and who is not taxed, who is and who is not subsidized, and
who is and who is not expropriated. Yet, not all government choices may be rent-seeking.
Politicians and the public may have their own non-social objectives, too. For example,
in the TARP (discussed in more detail in the next section), the government explicitly
considered maximizing the return on investment in bailed-out firms.10 If government
really views itself as a taxpayer-sponsored vulture fund, then it is likely ill-suited to address
the social-externalities problems.
Imperfect government undermines the attractiveness of interventions writ large. However,
our model is robust to the introduction of moderate violations, which tend to shrink—but
not necessarily eliminate—the contingencies where efficient bailouts are feasible and
desirable. Of course, when governmental misbehavior and waste grow prohibitively large
relative to the social benefits of bailouts, the efficiency case for intervention disappears
altogether.
5. Bailouts are more advantageous if replacement managers and employees are as efficient
as incumbent managers and employees (i.e., if their cost of effort, c, is equal). The
government can then (commit to) expropriate them fully in a bailout without adverse
consequences in the L state—and without suffering time inconsistency concerns. Ex-
propriating existing manager allows the government to maintain the same managerial
incentives that prevailed in the absence of intervention. Expropriating owners allows
10For example, in its March 2011 report, the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel notes that the US Treasury
officials at times tended to alternate inconsistently between articulating social welfarist goals (e.g., employment,
economic growth, investment) and recouping a return on investment for taxpayers (Congressional Oversight
Panel 2011, page 188).
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the government to maintain the same investment incentives that prevailed in the ab-
sence of intervention. Even when bailouts are justified on efficiency grounds, they are
unlikely to win popular support among the most focal (or vocal) constituencies. Indeed,
we have already argued that efficient bailouts would likely augur resistance among the
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. (Of course, the same parties may
not fight bailouts in actual distress if they can then avoid complete expropriation.) In
many situations, it is a plausible assumption that failed incumbents were not particularly
good. However, if the replacements are even worse, then government bailouts becomes a
tradeoff. If the government can commit itself to fire employees and managers at time 2, it
can retain incentives at time 1 (on pre-bailout firms) at the loss of operational efficiency
at time 2.
An even more extreme form of holdup can occur if firms or their employees can threaten
to turn down the bailout, holding out for larger transfer payments from the government.
This danger may be particularly acute for “too big to fail” firms (e.g., Citibank, Bank of
America), where S is also known to be very high.
We could adapt our model to assume that the bailout recipient firms are able to hold
out for some fraction of the total available public surplus, sv2. Introducing such hold
ups into the model would have negative welfare effects, because it would sharpen the
government’s budget constraint and reduce firms’ incentives to avoid bailouts. In turn,
such hold ups would require the government to levy a larger tax on successful firms.
When the hold-up problems are sufficiently large, bailouts could even become unjustified
on efficiency grounds and impossible to implement. One possible way to contend with
this possibility is to give government the power to force a company to accept a bailout
(and its attendant terms).11
Our model was designed to explore how bailouts can be conducted without distorting
effort or investment choices. Our model did not consider even more aggressive government
interventions. Yet, as in all moral-hazard models, the government could push managerial effort
towards first-best. After all, it has access to a technology that the firm does not: it could further
subsidize revenues when successful. With higher revenues in the good state, firms would choose
to pay higher wages in the good states in order to motivate labor to work harder. Yet, in order
to fund this policy, the government would have to find sources of tax revenues. Because it
cannot tax failure (there are no funds) and because it does not want to tax success, its only
remaining tax lever is on firm entry. In effect, the government would want to confiscate the
11Interestingly, our model is robust to inside information about corporate revenues, R1, because the best
equilibrium policy is to expropriate both management and shareholders fully in case of failure. Thus, they do not
have an incentive to pretend to have failed. Extant inside information issues would make it even more difficult to
implement policies in which owners and/or managers are allowed to continue on.
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NPV of the projects up-front and use the resulting tax revenue to subsidize future success. This
result is an implication that also arises in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). These models show
that taxing capital is inefficient, because capital accumulation can bring forth greater gains
than labor accumulation. Chamley and Judd highlight only that the optimal policy in these
models is to tax labor instead of capital, but the government could also expropriate all capital
opportunities at the outset, and use the resulting revenues to subsidize later investment success.
Of course, such policies suffer from subgame-perfect credibility problems: if the government
can expropriate capital owners at the outset, can it commit not to do so later on?
In focusing on the sources of efficiency gains and losses of government intervention, we
have neglected the difficult issue of redistribution among different participants in the economy.
We have mentioned that the losers are investors, and the winners are diffuse stakeholders
and potential replacement managers. However, this problem is even more complex than we
have let on so far. In our model, firms are homogeneous. The government’s budget must be
in actuarial balance. That is, the expected tax revenues must cover the expected costs of the
bailout. Tax revenues are collected from “winner” firms. The notion of an actuarial balance
is critical, because a single firm cannot both succeed and thus pay taxes, and also require a
bailout. This form of actuarial budget balancing is identical to an alternative budget balance
condition that requires aggregate tax revenues to offset aggregate outlays across a population
of firms. In essence, the population of “winner” firms (first-period successes) underwrite the
bailout population of “loser” firms (first-period failures). Of course, ex ante, because all firms
are identical, each is probabilistically both a payer of taxes and a recipient of bailout money.
Yet the isomorphism between actuarial and aggregate budget balance may no longer hold
when firms are heterogeneous. (For example, they may face different values of R1.) Firms with
high enough R1 may require no bailouts, because they will finance their own restarts. Firms
with low enough R1 may also require no bailouts, because it is inefficient to rescue them. It is
only for some firms in the middle that bailouts may be “fair.”
Redistribution may also be easier if bailouts are randomly distributed: the winner firms can
cover the loser firms. However, in a crisis, many firms may simultaneously need capital, possibly
making government less inclined to hand out subsidies. On the other hand, it is plausible
that deadweight losses arising from liquidation are higher during crises, which should induce
government to be more inclined to bail out firms.
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4 TARP
In the automobile bailout of 2008, incumbent shareholders were wiped out, senior management
and board members were fired, and labor unions and dealers accepted some concessions.
Despite strong initial skepticism, some commentators now portray the $80-billion automobile
bailouts in more charitable tones. For example, in November 2010, BusinessWeek reported:
General Motors Co.’s initial public offering showed that while U.S. President Barack
Obama’s administration may lose billions on the auto-industry bailout, the national
budget and economy might be better off for it.
The U.S. sold almost half of its stake in the nation’s largest automaker for $33 a
share—about $10 less than it needs to break even. The remaining shares will need
to sell for about $20 higher to make up the difference. GM opened at $35 and
stayed within $1.11 of that price all day. Selling the remaining shares at that price
would produce a loss of about $9 billion.
That may go down as a bargain. The U.S. would have lost $28.6 billion in spending
on social services and missing tax revenue if not for the bailout of GM, its former
lending arm and Chrysler Group LLC, according to a study released Nov. 17 by the
Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
“GM ends up an economic contributor to the U.S. economy,...It’s manufacturing
products, it’s creating jobs, it’s buying wholesale parts, it’s doing what an industrial
company is supposed to do.”
The government sold its last Chrysler shares in 2011, losing $12.5 − $13.8 ≈ $1.3 billion.
It sold its last GM shares in December 2013, losing $49.5 − $39 ≈ $10.5 billion. Treasury
Secretary Lew suggested that the rescue saved 1 million jobs and stopped the American auto
industry from collapsing.
Of course, significant academic skepticism remains to this day about the wisdom of bailouts
as a categorical matter. Our model provides the means for assessing the interventions under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008-9 from an academic economic perspective.
First, our model endorses the decisions of the Treasury to squeeze out both existing share-
holders and incumbent managers of GM and Chrysler. The managerial expropriations are
consistent with our model. They succeeded in motivating other managers (specifically, those of
Ford) to work harder to avoid the same fate. However, employees and labor unions were not
equally expropriated.
Rattner (2010) provides some color to the process in the Chrysler and GM bailouts. The
aforementioned holdout problems were significant. On page 108, Rattner recalls a conversation
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with Jimmy Lee Bainbridge of J.P. Morgan, a major creditor, who seemed to count on the
government interest in keeping the firm alive:
In our phone calls, he also relentlessly reminded me that creditors deserve to be
paid. “When you lend somebody $6.9 billion,” he would say, “you expect to get $6.9
billion back. And not a penny less.”...Chrysler debt was trading at around 15 cents
on the dollar (admittedly, infrequently), and according to Chrysler’s own analysis,
the liquidation value of the company was perhaps as low as $1 billion. Clearly,
Jimmy didn’t believe that the Obama administration would be willing to push back
and let the banks take over Chrysler rather than cave in to their demands.
It was only after Pres Obama’s televised speech, in which Obama signaled his willingness to
liquidate Chrysler, that this creditor changed perspective:
Jimmy Lee of JPMorgan called. “We need to talk!” he barked. “I thought there was
nothing for us to talk about,” I said innocently. “You said $6.9 billion and not a
penny less’, and that’s not going to work for us.” “That was then and this is now,”
he said...This was precisely what we had hoped to accomplish when we’d urged the
President to set a firm deadline for Chrysler, with liquidation to follow unless all
the stakeholders agreed that the sacrifice would be shared.
The treatment of creditors has remained a controversial subject to this day. Some conservative
academic and business-oriented publications lament a “strong-arming” of the process by the
Government and a claimed breakdown of the rule of law in the bankruptcy proceedings (despite
its court approval). For example, in June 2012, the Liberty Law Talk reports “that Professor
Zywicki stresses that the Chrysler bailout abandoned the bankruptcy code’s clear and known
rules regarding creditor interests that derive from the code’s 19th century origins. This allowed
for the sinister use of the public trough by special interests that benefited from the bailouts.
Moreover, Professor Zywicki highlights the fallout in corporate bond markets from the subversion
of the legitimated process for corporate bankruptcy worked by the Obama administration.” Our
model does not take a stance on relative creditor priorities, but it argues that the government’s
chief concern is the preservation of the firm, while avoiding giving owners (now the creditors)
incentives to welcome bailouts. Infusing its own funding, the government had no strong
economic reason to treat existing creditors in order of the non-bailout priority. (The lenders
ended up receiving 29 cents on the dollar.)
The treatment of employees has remained similarly controversial. Some but not all employ-
ees and unions were not expropriated. Rattner (2010, p.138) reports that
...our groundbreaking rescue plan ended up having to compete with the news of Rick
Wagoner’s ouster...I was stunned by commentaries suggesting that the government
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was somehow overreaching by replacing a CEO who had lost $11 billion of taxpayer
money in three months—and had been asking for more. No private-sector investor
would have put up with that; it was commonplace to make large infusions of new
capital contingent upon a management change.
Non-management labor was treated unevenly. For example, while GM worker pensions remained
largely unaffected, those of Delphi (a subsidiary of GM) had to take a cut of all their healthcare
benefits and 70% of their pension. Nevertheless, 65% of Chrysler and 17.5% of GM was
eventually handed over to the union (pension funds). To the extent that their continued stakes
depress labor’s incentives to avoid future bailouts, the government bailout was not efficient.
In contrast to the car bailouts, in many of the bank bailouts, the government was not
particularly ambitious in attempting to displace the owners, managers, and traders who received
bailout funds and who had presided over the banks’ declines, much less to claw back managers’
and traders’ accrued salaries and benefits (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010)). Our model
suggests that expropriation, not only of the shareholders and their boards, but also of the
managers, traders and other employees, should be a presumptive aspect of a bailout as a
means for deterring future crises. We believe that it is difficult to argue that the managers
and traders that had failed to curb the risks of these financial firms were so valuable that they
were irreplaceable. More likely, the financial firms possessed enough residual holdup and lobby
power to prevent the government from conducting an efficient bailout.
Second, our model points out that the government’s intermittent emphasis on generating
an “investment return” from bailout funds was misguided. In virtually every TARP bailout,
the government functionally levied an extraordinary ‘tax’ on recipients by structuring its cash
infusions as either loans or stock purchases. The political appeal of generating a return from
ownership stakes is apparent. However, our model points out that government taxation and/or
ownership simply reduced the price that private investors were willing to pay. If this demand
led the government to run these firms longer than it should have (assuming governments are
less efficient than the private sector in running companies), this would have created another
inefficiency.12 Of course, when existing owners were not fully displaced, the extra tax may have
been merely a second-best attempt to expropriate their existing holdings.
12In one sense, perhaps, under the GM and Chrysler bailouts the government arguably enjoyed competence
that rivaled that of private owners. Its task force, responsible for the initial stage of the resuscitation, consisted of
a team of unusually competent outside private-equity capitalists with business expertise. Moreover, it appears
that the task force was not as motivated by a desire to enrich itself, as by a desire for public service (which our
model does not allow for). Thus, the government may have followed not the letter, but the spirit of our model’s
recommendation. And, as our model suggests, by 2010, the government had begun to divest its stake in GM. The
divestment is on track for full divestment by 2014.
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Third, our model suggests that bailouts must generally be funded through special taxes on
healthy firms rather than through retrospective assessments on bailout recipients (in the form
of government owned debt and equity). Early drafts of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act proposed
the creation of a $50 billion bailout fund financed by healthy firms deemed to be systemically
significant. Ironically, opponents in the Senate ultimately blocked this proposal, asserting that
it would exacerbate moral hazard (Schwarcz (2011)). Our model suggests, quite to the contrary,
that the presence of such a fund should not influence the moral hazard if bailouts are well
administered. The presence of such a fund—over the vocal objection of industry lobbies—may
however be the only way that socially-beneficial bailouts can be sold to voters.13
Fourth, our model suggests that the opposition to bailouts from owners and managers and
the opposition from business groups was to be expected. Such opposition is an unavoidable
side-effect of any good bailout.
5 Related Literature
The most important difference of our paper from the existing literature is our focus not on the
fact that bailouts can have efficiency costs, but on the fact that they need not have efficiency
costs. Our model emphasizes that when owners and managers can be fully expropriated and
NPV can be proportionally taxed, there are no obvious efficiency losses. More realistically, our
model contributes to prescriptions of when and how to conduct bailouts.
Most of the extant literature on bailouts has focused on bank bailouts. Banks are peculiar,
because many of their incentive problems derive from large financial debt obligations that are
intrinsic to their normal operations. Our own paper seems more suitable to analyzing situations
in which the distortionary effects of leverage plays a secondary role, e.g., as in the case of the
car company bailouts.
The single closest paper to our own is Philippon and Schnabl (2011), in which a reduction
in lending by one bank can reduce other banks’ investments. Thus, the benefit of a government
bailout is a reduction in the systemic debt overhang, which enhances economically efficient
investment. The optimal contract makes each bank pivotal by conditioning a systemic bailout
on wide participation.14 The cost of the bailout is paid for by taxes on household endowments,
13It is debatable whether the government will have the capability not to intervene if it will be catastrophic not to
intervene. Our model suggests that a commitment to expropriate the corporate owners and managers may be
more effective than an attempt to limit the pool of funds for bailouts in the future. After all, there was no such
fund in place in 2008-9, either, and yet the government did rescue firms.
14The paper also shows that if there is excessive participation in the bailout by banks which privately know
that they already have good projects, then the regulator can improve efficiency by demanding junior securities. It
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which causes a parametrically assumed efficiency loss that is linear in the tax required.
Our model shares some features but has different foci. For example, in our model, the social
benefits do not accrue to active and taxable participants. Thus, it is not possible to design a
contract that makes all parties willing to participate—after all, it is not the firms that lose if
a bailout does not take place. (The equivalent of the Philippon and Schnabl (2011) contract
would be to make a bailout contingent upon participation of each stakeholder.) Philippon and
Schnabl (2011) point out the social externalities among many banks, where all banks benefit
from more financial system stability. Our model focuses on bail-outs, in which individual firms
can be in trouble, rescuing one does not make it easier or harder to rescue another, and multiple
firms need not be rescued at the same time. (Our model can capture some time-varying and
cross-sectional variation in the exogenous S parameter.) Yet another difference of our model
from Philippon and Schnabl (2011) is that inefficient investment in our model can be avoided.
There is no debt overhang. In fact, we do not view our model as much a model of banks, as
we view it of a model of government bailouts for generic non-bank firms, such as the GM and
Chrysler. But like Philippon and Schnabl (2011), we focus on the socially-inefficient aspects of
firm behavior. Bailouts are needed because it is too costly for the firm to finance continuation,
given their struggle with their own internal moral-hazard (managerial agency) problems. Our
paper focused on on the internal and external moral-hazard problems and their best remedies.
Our (endogenous) tax implications are not linear as in Philippon and Schnabl (2011). We
also offered specific policy recommendations (on managerial and owner retention, bailout
funding, etc.) different from those in Philippon and Schnabl (2011), and showed that firms
and managers—the Chamber of Commerce—will lobby for a system in which they do not face
a priori taxation to cover future bailouts.
Philippon and Skreta (2011) and Tirole (2011) study adverse-selection models, in which
firms differ in the publicly-unknown qualities of their existing assets. In contrast, our model
studies moral-hazard problems in firms with known assets and opportunities. In their models,
the government ends up subsidizing only the worst types, whereas in our model, the government
ends up subsidizing only the marginal types. In their models, the parameterized cost of public
funds is exogenous, whereas in our model, the costs of raising bailout revenue (through taxes)
is endogenous. In Philippon and Skreta (2011), the acceptance of government assistance sends
a negative signal to outside capital market participants, which increases the recipients’ private
borrowing costs outside of the program. Philippon and Skreta’s (2011) government objective
is to obtain a target level of investment that is the cheapest to taxpayers. In our model, the
government maximizes total social value instead. Their optimal government intervention is
a debt contract. Our’s is a direct subsidy (because any government stake raises the required
would probably not be difficult to think of a situation in which the problem is too high an uptake by banks which
know that they should (socially) not be bailed out. In this case, debt may be a better contract.
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subsidy to entice private participants). In Tirole (2011), there is a spillover aspect of bailouts.
The bailout of one firm raises the cost of the next bailout. Firms become progressively more
hesitant to participate as progressively weaker banks have already been bailed out before them.
Like Philippon and Skreta (2011), the government takes stakes in exchange for its subsidy,
though in equity and direct purchases of firm assets, whereas in our model, the government
should take no such stake.15
There are also pre-2008 crisis papers in the banking literature in which bailouts can be
valuable. For example, in Diamond (2001), banks would lose socially-valuable information if
allowed to disappear. In Gorton and Huang (2004), asset prices depend on liquidity, and the
government can enhance asset values by tapping its effectively unlimited credit. In Aghion,
Bolton, and Fries (1999), managers can be reluctant to liquidate underperforming loans when
bank regulators close bankrupt banks aggressively. Bailouts are designed to minimize such
welfare losses. The classic paper advocating some government involvement is Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), which showed how the private market can fail and how deposit insurance or
convertibility restrictions can enhance the social outcome. As expected, deposit insurance imme-
diately raises moral-hazard concerns, e.g., as in Gorton and Rosen (1995), Chan, Greenbaum,
and Thakor (1992), Boyd and Runkle (1993), Calomiris (1999), etc. Ex-ante regulation of the
banking sector is usually recommended as a corollary to ex-post deposit insurance.
Similarly, in a long number of papers on the subject of government procurement and
intervention, Tirole emphasizes how firms can game the system. For example, in Farhi and
Tirole (2011), firms correlate on exposures in order to benefit more from government bailouts:
...the central argument of the paper is that private leverage choices depend on the
anticipated policy reaction...An accommodating interest rate policy involves (a) an
invisible subsidy from consumers to banks (the lower yield on savings transfers
resources from consumers to borrowing institutions), (b) current costs, such as
the (subsidized) financing of unworthy projects by unconstrained entities, and (c)
deferred costs (the sowing of seeds for the next crisis, both through incentives for
maturity mismatch, going forward, and the authorities’ loss of credibility)...When
everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but interven-
ing, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social
costs.
Finally, Diamond and Rajan (2005) is unusual in that governmental bailouts can backfire even
ex-post and themselves cause further insolvencies. Of course, although our paper has not
15Like us, Tirole suggests “just enough” intervention. Although moral hazard is not central to his analysis, he
demonstrates (as do we) that bailouts can exacerbate moral-hazard concerns. The paper does not derive an
optimal bailout in the presence of moral hazard.
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allowed for an additional direct waste parameter in the process of government intervention, we
do not suggest that one should ignore the governmental rent-seeking issues first raised in Tullock
(1967) and Tirole (1994). Although these papers raise significant real-world problems, our own
view of government intervention, though skeptic, is decidedly less pessimistic. Our model’s
assumption of an optimizing government was a useful analysis device, not a description of
real life. To the extent that rent-seeking makes government intervention more costly, it shrinks
the regions in which governmental intervention is beneficial. However, the main insight—that
when social externalities are large, bailouts can have low welfare costs under well-designed
bailouts—is robust.
As far as we know, no other model of bailouts has focused on the non-distortionary a priori
effort incentive effects of tying bailouts both to owner expropriation and managerial dismissals.
6 Conclusion
In its final report to Congress in March 2011, the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel (COP)
offered the following assessment of the automotive industry bailout:
Treasury’s interventions in the automotive industry, in particular, raise moral hazard
concerns. In some ways, Treasury actually mitigated moral hazard through its very
strict approach to these companies: it forced GM and Chrysler to enter bankruptcy,
a step not required of other major TARP-recipient institutions. However, the mere
fact that Treasury intervened in the automotive industry, rescuing companies that
were not banks and were not particularly interconnected within the financial system,
extended the “too big to fail” guarantee and its associated moral hazard to non-
financial firms. The implication may seem to be that any company in America can
receive a government backstop, so long as its collapse would cost enough jobs or
deal enough economic damage. (Congressional Oversight Panel (2011), at 185).
Our model was designed to help frame and assess these concerns. It extended a canonical
agency model that explored the trade-offs of governmental interventions with tax-financed
bailouts. Our analysis suggests that bailouts are not the taxation and moral-hazard bane that
they are often considered to be. When the diffuse stakes are high, government intervention can
be conducted efficiently when:
1. Owners can be and are fully expropriated in a bailout,
2. Managers and employees can be and are fully expropriated in a bailout, and
3. Bailouts can be and are funded through proportional taxation on profits that owners and
their firms cannot escape.
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In addition, given a first-best bailout, the government cannot finance bailouts through extraor-
dinary levies on bailed-out firms, but only through levies on healthy firms. It is only when these
prescriptions are violated that bailout inefficiencies are likely to be large.
28
Firm invests I1
Firm chooses w1
Managerial Effort e1
Failure (L)
Revenues 0
Social Benefits 0
Abandon
Firm invests I2
FF: Fire/Keep M
Firm chooses w2,L
Managerial Effort e2,L
Failure
Revenues 0
Social Benefits 0
pr
ob
1
− e 2
,L
Success
Revenues R2,L
Social Benefits S
Pay Wages w2,L
prob
e2,L
pr
ob
1 −
e 1
Success (H)
Revenues R1
Social Benefits S
Pay Wage w1
Abandon
Firm invests I2
FF: Fire/Keep M
Firm chooses w2,H
Managerial Effort e2,H
Failure
Revenues 0
Social Benefits 0
pr
ob
1
− e 2
,H
Success
Revenues R2,H
Social Benefits S
Pay Wages w2,H
prob
e2,H
prob e1
Figure 1: Game Structure without Government
This shows the sequential structure of the game, assuming that the firm decides to begin the
project. The manager decides on her effort, which determines the success probability.
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